Claims Russia is lobbying Indonesia for long-term basing rights for strategic bombers or surveillance aircraft in Papua aren’t only speculative but deeply flawed in their strategic logic.
The hysteria being whipped up in Australian media and political circles ignores Russia’s consistent foreign policy posture, misrepresents Indonesia’s foundational commitment to neutrality, and deliberately echoes Cold War-style fear-mongering to revive a failing national security narrative in Australia’s election discourse.
The core of the report – that Russia formally requested access to Indonesia’s Manuhua air base in Papua – rests on a Janes defence article citing unnamed Indonesian officials. The Australian government hasn’t confirmed the report, and Indonesia’s own defence ministry has brushed it aside, stating they are "not aware of that issue." Nevertheless, Opposition Leader Peter Dutton and a swathe of security commentators have leapt to worst-case conclusions, calling it a “catastrophic failure” and an existential threat to Australia.
Even if such a request were made, it is almost certainly dead on arrival.
Unlike the US– which maintains more than 750 military bases in over 80 countries – Russia doesn’t operate a global network of military installations. Its only significant overseas base outside the former Soviet Union is in Syria, at the Hmeimim airbase, which directly serves Russia’s interests in the Middle East conflict zone. Moscow’s approach to overseas military presence is transactional, minimal, and strategic – not expansive.
Russia is currently embroiled in a prolonged and resource-draining war in Ukraine. It’s illogical to believe Moscow would seek to stretch its military logistics into Southeast Asia – a region where it has no territorial claims, no direct military alliances, and where it would face immense logistical and geopolitical challenges.
What strategic advantage would Russia gain by placing a few aircraft 1300km from Australia? The notion this would serve as a useful outpost for "intelligence gathering" or "power projection" isn’t only technologically outdated – in an era of satellites and cyber-intelligence – but also diplomatically ruinous for both Russia and Indonesia.
Indonesia’s foreign policy doctrine of bebas aktif (free and active) has consistently emphasised non-alignment and strategic autonomy. It was one of the founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement and has historically resisted foreign military basing on its territory. Even as Indonesia modernises its military and deepens ties with powers like China, Russia, and the US, it does so through multipolar balancing, not alignment.
If anything, Jakarta’s vocal opposition to the AUKUS pact – which it sees as a destabilising presence in the Indo-Pacific – underscores its resistance to foreign military escalation in the region. To suggest the same country would suddenly grant basing rights to Russia, in the middle of a brutal and controversial war in Ukraine, ignores decades of established diplomatic behaviour.
President Prabowo Subianto may have met with Vladimir Putin and expressed interest in BRICS, but symbolic gestures do not equate to security pacts or military alignment. In fact, Russia has made similar access requests before, and Indonesia has consistently denied permanent basing rights. The 2017 stopover by Russian aircraft was a temporary visit, not a permanent stationing – and nothing since has indicated Jakarta is willing to shift that stance.
Dutton’s claim this development signals another intelligence failure reeks of opportunistic alarmism. It’s clear this narrative serves a domestic political purpose more than a geopolitical one: to paint the Albanese government as weak on national security and inattentive to regional developments is not only insane but pathetic at best.
Such tactics do a disservice to Australia’s strategic credibility. Fear-mongering about Russian bombers being parked in Indonesia plays into a “Red Menace 2.0” mentality that clouds sober analysis. It also alienates Jakarta, a critical regional partner that has worked constructively with Canberra across trade, counter-terrorism and maritime security.
Moreover, Dutton’s suggestion Russian aircraft in Papua would pose the same kind of threat as Chinese forces ignores the vastly different nature of those relationships. China is the dominant economic force in the region, with territorial ambitions in the South China Sea and growing assertiveness. Russia, by contrast, has neither the capability nor the will to permanently project military power into Southeast Asia – especially not through Indonesia, a country that has never hosted a foreign base and guards its sovereignty jealously.
There’s a legitimate conversation to be had about Australia’s preparedness in an increasingly complex Indo-Pacific region. But sensationalising unlikely scenarios based on unconfirmed reports only distorts public debate. Russia establishing a base in Indonesia is not just improbable – it is strategically incoherent.
The Albanese government is right to proceed cautiously and seek clarification through diplomatic channels. That is not a sign of weakness, but of professionalism. Jakarta deserves respect and engagement, not suspicion and pressure driven by electioneering.
The louder voices claiming imminent Russian jets are soon to take off from Biak Island don’t speak for Indonesia – nor do they speak for the facts.
excellent read George. I hope Dutton doesn't get traction.
Well-written article George analyzes well, and you made a good point, and that is how disinformation works in favor of Russia. After all, they mastered that discipline, and yet it caused panic. Russia doesn't need bases in foreign countries because this is not part of their doctrine; however, their presence in Kaliningrad and the Kuril Islands in Japan and Syria shows why Russia doesn't need multiple foreign bases. Add to this Russia's nuclear submarines operating in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, satellites, and missiles.no need for airbase in Indonesia.