Australia Doesn’t Need The Beating Of War Drums to Stay Safe

Richard Marles’ China scaremongering distracts from diplomacy, regional engagement, and Australia’s true security needs.

Leading Australia’s political pack in the critical realm of Defence, is Australia’s is Richard Marles. Marles isn’t only Deputy Prime Minister, he’s also the Minister for Defence, and it’s surprising, or less so for those who follow politics closely that positions of power and influence are usually held by the inadequately qualified for the portfolio they hold – Marles is one such politician.

Marles’ oversees a portfolio that demands strategic intellect, diplomacy, and historical knowledge of global affairs – vital for a portfolio like Defence.

Today, he continued to present himself as not only a Sinophobe but clueless about the portfolio he oversees - portraying China as the region’s “greatest risk” and presenting Australia as teetering on the edge of military conflict.

Marles’ comments mark a dangerous pivot away from rational foreign policy and toward costly paranoia. Behind the rhetoric of “defending Australia” lies a deeply flawed worldview—one that relies on Cold War-style threat inflation and locks Australia into an American strategic fantasy that is increasingly out of step with regional realities.

China isn’t preparing to invade Australia. That’s an admission Marles makes. Instead, the “threat” is framed in vague terms—disruption of shipping lanes, ambiguous “instability,” and a growing naval presence. Yet these assertions ignore a basic truth: the Asia-Pacific has been undergoing a power shift for decades, one driven as much by economics as by military developments.

Presenting China’s military modernisation as evidence of inevitable war is a leap of logic that serves the interests of Washington’s defence contractors more than Australian. China’s military spending—still a fraction of the US’s—is about securing its periphery and asserting regional influence, not launching unprovoked aggression.

If disruption of trade routes is the concern, surely the wiser path would be deeper diplomatic engagement, not ramping up militarisation that invites escalation. Australia’s economy is closely tied to China’s. Would Beijing, whose prosperity depends on open trade and energy flows through the region, risk it all for war with an ally of the US?

What Marles and Canberra’s defence establishment won’t admit is Australia’s security posture is increasingly being shaped not by independent strategic calculation, but by American geostrategic interests. AUKUS, sold as a deterrent, binds Australia to US military planning in ways that compromise our sovereignty.

Long-range nuclear-powered submarines, missile systems based on foreign command structures, and deeper integration with US forces all mean one thing: in the event of a Taiwan crisis or broader US-China conflict, Australia will be a launchpad—not a neutral actor.

Former Defence Secretary Dennis Richardson’s admission Australia would be involved in a war over Taiwan confirms what many have long warned: AUKUS isn’t about deterrence it’s about automatic entanglement.

It isn’t in Australia’s national interest. It’s a reckless gamble driven by a desire to appease Washington.

While Australia obsess over war games with China, it’s true strategic blind spot is right on its doorstep: Southeast Asia and the Pacific. These are the countries that matter most to Australia’s long-term security—and yet Marles and the defence establishment are distracted by submarine timelines and hypothetical missile strikes.

By focusing on high-end warfare with a distant superpower, Australia is ignoring the real drivers of instability in the region: climate change, economic inequality, disinformation, and political volatility. Investing in diplomacy, development, and climate resilience across the Pacific would do far more to secure Australia’s future than any number of Virginia-class submarines.

The invocation of the 1930s and comparisons to Hitler’s rise are lazy and misleading. China isn’t Nazi Germany and it’s not 1939. Using fear to justify ballooning defence budgets is a tactic as old as the military-industrial complex itself.

Historians like Geoffrey Blainey might warn of complacency, but they often overlook how war was also precipitated by excessive militarisation and alliance entrapments. Australia must learn lessons from the past - blindly following major powers into conflict can be just as dangerous as being unprepared.

Marles’ speech and the “Defending Australia” summit was a political performance designed to justify historically high defence spending. But the costs are real.

Every dollar spent on preparing for a war that may never come is a dollar not spent on schools, hospitals, housing, or climate resilience, housing or the homeless. As Australia faces a decade of budget deficits and domestic social needs unmet, funelling billions into defence projects with 20-year delivery timelines isn’t just bad policy—it’s an abdication of moral responsibility.

So, what’s the strategic payoff? To buy a false sense of security while making Australia a frontline target in someone else’s war?

Australians deserves more than fear and fatalism. They need a mature national conversation about security—one that includes diplomacy, independence, and restraint - questioning whether military integration with the US actually makes Australia safer – and the US continues to demonstrate it’s untrustworthy.

The hysteria over China’s rise is a distraction from the real work of securing Australia’s future. Australians don’t need more subs – they need greater vision.